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CLOSURE ORDERS: SAFEGUARD OF FAIR
TRIAL OR PRIOR RESTRAINT?
I. Introduction
In 1976 the Supreme Court decided that a trial court could not
constitutionally prohibit pretrial publicity by imposing a "gag
order" on members of the press.' This ruling has since been hotly
debated in the legal profession.2 The source of the dispute stems
from two constitutional guarantees in opposition. One insures the
defendant a fair trial by his peers;3 the other guarantees the press
freedom to report information to the public.4
When the press publishes information which prejudices the rights
of a defendant at trial, a difficult constitutional problem is created.'
At any trial, the jury should be impartial and the verdict must
reflect a determination of the facts as presented. If press reports are
seen or read by the members of a jury, the fair trial guarantee is
placed in jeopardy. At best, the jury is able to dismiss these reports
and decide the case solely on its merits.' At worst, the jury allows
1. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
2. See, e.g., Symposium, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 383
(1977); Kaplan, Free Press/Fair Trial Rights in Conflict: Freedom of the Press and the Rights
of the Individual, 29 OKLA. L. REv. 361 (1976). See also note 100 infra.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. The fair trial/free press controversy has posed a problem to the courts for a number of
years. One of the first cases which demonstrated the dangers of prejudicial press coverage to
the defendant was the Lindbergh kidnap-murder trial in 1933. Bruno Richard Hauptmann
was tried in Flemington, New Jersey, amidst a deluge of cameramen and news reporters. See
Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REV. 453, 454
(1940). The ensuing conviction was so predictable that a subsequent investigation by the
American Bar Association on the effects of prejudicial publicity described the case as
"perhaps the most spectacular and depressing example of improper publicity and professional
misconduct ever presented to the people of the United States in a criminal trial." Id.
Since that time a number of cases have repeatedly raised the "trial by press" issue before
the Supreme Court. See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S.
181 (1952); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965); Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). The most recent important decision by the Supreme Court
invalidated a "gag" order issued during trial. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976). For a detailed discussion of the Nebraska Press decision, see text accompanying notes
130-43 infra.
6. Some commentators believe that a jury will function efficiently even in the face of
prejudicial publicity. Simon, Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the
Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515 (1977);
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the newspapers to preordain the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant, and the trial is of little worth.7
In an attempt to protect the defendant at trial and simultane-
ously uphold the media's right to report newsworthy items without
interference, courts have provided for several protective alterna-
tives.' The most effective alternative may be to sequester the jury.
The press is thereby free to report the events of a trial, and, at the
same time, the jury members are insulated from any prejudice
media coverage may invoke. However, the "free press/fair trial"
controversy still remains when news articles are published prior to
selection of the jury. For example, when a notorious murder case is
closely covered by the press, it is not unusual that the majority of
prospective jurors has been prejudiced by one or more news items.,
Therefore a trial court will find it difficult to secure a fair trial for
the defendant if it is initially impossible to impanel an impartial
jury.
One solution, is for the court to restrict the ability of the press to
publish such information until after a jury is impanelled. However,
the Supreme Court ruled that a "gag" on the media violates the
freedom of the press guarantee.'" This decision was the last word
from the Supreme Court on this issue. Recently, however, the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari in a case arising out of the New York
courts which takes this question one step further. In Gannett Com-
pany v. De Pasquale," the New York Court of Appeals held that
upon a motion by the defendant, a trial judge may properly close a
Simon & Marshall, The Jury System, in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND AcTION 211,
220 (S. Nagel ed. 1972); R. Simon, The Jury and the Defense of Insanity 219 (1967). It would
be difficult, if not impossible, however, to prove that a defendant's rights are always safe-
guarded by the jury in such a situation.
7. See the description of the publicity surrounding the Lindbergh kidnapping trial in
Hallam, Some Object Lessons on Publicity in Criminal Trials, 24 MINN. L. REv. 453, 454
(1940). See also the Supreme Court's description of the intensity of news coverage of the
murder trial of Dr. Sheppard in, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
8. For a compilation of these alternatives, see Erickson, Fair Trial and Free Press: The
Practical Dilemma, 29 STAN. L. REv. 485, 491-94 (1977). Among those listed were closure of
pretrial hearings, continuance, change of venue, voir dire of prospective jurors, preliminary
admonitions of impartiality to each juror, final instructions to the jury, and sequestration.
Id. at 492-93.
9. See note 7 supra.
10. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
11. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
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pretrial suppression hearing to the public and press. In addition, a
court may temporarily withhold the record from public scrutiny if
"press commentary from those hearings would threaten the impa-
neling of a constitutionally impartial jury in the county of venue." 2
In so ruling the court relaxed the strict standard previously imposed
on a trial judge before the issuance of a closure order is deemed
proper.'" More importantly, the court's ruling indirectly permits a
New York trial judge to restrain the right of the press to publish the
facts of a judicial hearing. In the past, this information was exempt
from governmental interference under the first amendment freedom
of the press guarantee. 4 The New York Court of Appeals upheld the
closure order on the grounds that it was necessary in order to protect
the defendants' right to a fair trial.
The Gannett case is the logical outgrowth of the Supreme Court's
landmark holding in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, where
the Court struck down a "gag" order imposed on the press during
trial.'" The Court announced that the constitutional validity of any
type of restraint on the press would be upheld in only the most
unusual circumstances.'" Although Nebraska Press was undoubt-
edly a victory for the media,' the decision left a number of questions
unanswered. Most importantly, because the Court specifically lim-
ited the ruling to "gag" orders, other more indirect restraints on the
press continue to be issued at the trial level. The Gannett case
upheld a "closure" order which excluded the press from a pretrial
hearing.'" A "closure" order differs from a "gag" order only in that
the press is not restrained from reporting information; rather it is
restrained from obtaining it.'" Regardless of the labels that courts
12. 43 N.Y. 2d at 380, 372 N.E. 2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
13. See text accompanying notes 77-78 infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 111-29 infra.
15. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Court recognized the Gannett problem in its decision. See
id. at 564 n.8; cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (state may not
extend cause of action for damages for invasion of privacy caused by publication of name of
deceased rape victim which was revealed in connection with prosecution of a crime).
16. The requirements set forth by the Court strictly limit the impostion of any type of
restraining order on the press. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562.
17. See Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REV. 411, 412
(1977).
18. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
19. While a "gag" order is a court-imposed restraint placed on the press after the informa-
tion has been conveyed, the "closure" order prevents newsmen from entering the courtroom.
1978]
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place on these orders, the result is the same. The media is effectively
prevented from reporting information to the public.
This Note examines the Gannett decision and outlines the prob-
lems it presents to the United States Supreme Court. Part III' traces
the history of the Gannett case in the New York courts. Part III2
investigates the historically protected guarantee of the right to an
open trial, and demonstrates that the stringent standard for exclud-
ing the public from any judicial proceeding has been relaxed by the
Gannett case. Part IV2 explores the right of the press to be free from
any restraint on publication. This entails an examination of the
''prior restraint" doctrine in past decisions of the Supreme Court.
In addition, the failure of the Gannett court to consider this aspect
of the case will be criticized. Part V23 analyzes the ability of the
Court to entertain the Gannett case although the suppression hear-
ing and trial have been completed and the information made public.
Part VIII suggests some of the inherent dangers to the criminal
justice system if the Gannett ruling is liberally construed by courts
in the future.
II. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale
Petitioner, Gannett Company, owns and operates two daily news-
papers and one television station in the Rochester, New York area.2 5
As part of its news reporting activities, Gannett assigned a staff
reporter to attend the pretrial suppression hearing held in connec-
tion with the highly publicized murder prosecution of Kyle Edwin
Greathouse and Davis Ray Jones. 6 The grand jury of Seneca County
As a result, media representatives are unable to obtain information concerning the proceed-
ings of a trial. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d at 383, 372 N.E.2d at 552, 401
N.Y.S.2d at 764 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
20. See text accompanying notes 25-41 infra.
21. See text accompanying notes 42-99 infra.
22. See text accompanying notes 100-59 infra.
23. See text accompanying notes 160-77 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 178-82 infra.
25. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 374, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 758 (1977).
26. Id. at 374-75, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59. The defendants were charged
with robbing and murdering a former Seneca County police officer who disappeared while he
was on a fishing trip. The victim's body was never recovered, but his boat was found laced
with bullet holes, and both his truck and revolver had been stolen. A nationwide search for
the defendants ended in Michigan after a three day chase which required the use of helicop-
ters and tracking dogs. The defendants were found driving the victim's truck, and, after
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returned an indictment charging the accused with second degree
murder and larceny." At the pretrial suppression hearing the de-
fense attorney requested that the proceeding be held in camera28 on
the grounds that adverse publicity had jeopardized the defendants'
right to a fair trial.29 At trial, County Court Judge Daniel De Pas-
quale granted an oral order which enjoined the distribution of the
record to the public and press, and closed the hearing, thus barring
the Garnett reporter from the courtroom." In response, Gannett
Company requested postponement of the pretrial hearing until the
press's right to be present and to gain access to any undisclosed
transcripts was argued. Judge De Pasquale denied this petition.,,
After hearing oral argument, he again denied a request to vacate the
order nunc pro tunc on grounds that there was a reasonable proba-
bility of prejudice to the defendant.32
questioning, Greathouse led authorities to where he had buried the stolen revolver. Local
newspapers had been reporting these facts on a daily basis. Id.
27. Id. at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
28. The pretrial suppression hearing was held pursuant to N.Y. CrIM. PROc. LAW § 710.20
(McKinney Supp. 1975), which states in part:
Upon motion of a defendant who (a) is aggrieved by unlawful or improper acquisition
of evidence and has reasonable cause to believe that such may be offered against him
in a criminal action, or (b) claims that improper identification testimony may be
offered against him in a criminal action, a court may, under circumstances prescribed
in this article, order that such evidence be suppressed or excluded upon the grounds
that it:
3. Consists of a record or potential testimony reciting or describing a statement of
such defendant involuntarily made, within the meaning of section 60.45, to a public
servant engaged in law enforcement activity or to a person then acting under his
direction or in cooperation with him.
Id.
29. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 758 (1977).
30. Id. Judge De Pasquale allowed the closure order on the grounds that
these matters are in the nature of a Huntley hearing and suppression of physical
evidence, and is not the trial. . . . Certain evidentiary matters may come up in the
testimony of the People's witnesses that may be prejudicial to the defendants, and for
these reasons the court is going to grant both [defendants'] motions.
Id.
A "Huntley" hearing is a pretrial proceeding whereby the voluntariness of a defendant's
confession is examined to insure that any information given by the defendant after apprehen-
sion, but before trial, has been legally obtained. See People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 204
N.E.2d 179, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1965).
31. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 108, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721 (4th Dep't
1976).
32. Id.
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The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court reversed
the trial court and granted the petitioner an Article 78 proceeding33
vacating the closure order.34 In a per curiam opinion, Judge De
Pasquale's closure order was held to be defective in two respects.
First, the defense failed to establish the extraordinary circumstan-
ces necessary to close a judicial proceeding. 3 Secondly, the exclu-
sionary order infringed upon the petitioner's first amendment right
to publish without interference from the government."
The argument posed by Gannett Company on appeal to New
York's highest court was twofold. The publisher claimed that the
sixth amendment to the Constitution, as well as New York statutory
law, permits any member of the public, including representatives of
the press, to freely attend all judicial proceedings. 7 Furthermore,
the restrictive order issued by Judge De Pasquale effectively pre-
33. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW art. 78 (McKinney 1963) provides in pertinent part:
§ 7801. NATURE OF PROCEEDING.
Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or prohibition
shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article. Wherever in any statute reference
is made to a writ or order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition, such reference shall,
so far as applicable be deemed to refer to the proceeding authorized by this arti-
cle . ..
§ 7802. PARins
(a) Definition of "body or officer." The expression "body or officer" includes every
court, tribunal,. whose action may be affected by a proceeding under this article.
Id. §§ 7801-02.
34. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 110, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 724 (4th Dep't
1976).
35. Id. It has been the practice of New York courts to impose a closure order only if the
party making the motion is able to demonstrate to the court that extraordinary circumstances
exist. See notes 76-77 infra and accompanying text.
36. 55 A.D.2d at 110, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The court concluded that the effect of such an
order "restricts media access to information ordinarily made available to the general public"
and therefore "is merely a substitute for a prior restraint." Id. at 110-11, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
In the past, the Supreme Court has consistently held that any type of governmental inter-
ference prior to publication violates the first amendment freedom of speech guarantee. When-
ever possible, the Court has attempted to inhibit questionable publications by imposing
criminal or civil sanctions'after the publication has reached the public. In this way the
Government is not forced to censor constitutionally protected speech. See Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Since the 1930s, the Court has always viewed a "prior restraint" on
publication as particularly offensive to the first amendment, Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697 (1931), and has consistently repeated that any system of prior restraint on expression
bears a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). For
a more detailed discussion of the prior restraint doctrine, see notes 111-29 infra and accompa-
nying text.
37. See 43 N.Y.2d at 373 (Points of Counsel).
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vented the press from reporting the pretrial hearing to the public
and thereby interfered with the first amendment freedom of the
press guarantee."' In response, counsel for Judge De Pasquale
argued that closure is properly ordered when necessary to insure the
accused a fair trial.3 9
The New York Court of Appeals upheld the closure order primar-
ily on the grounds that the defendants' right to a fair trial could only
be achieved if the courtroom was temporarily closed." The court's
decision conflicts with New York statutes and prior case law uphold-
ing the open trial right.' To determine whether a restrictive order
of this nature was merited in the Gannett case, it is necessary to
examine the facts in view of the historical purposes of the public
trial guarantee.
III. The Right To a Public Trial
The right to a public trial evolved from the English common law'2
and has been carefully protected in American jurisprudence. 3 The
38. Id. (Points of Counsel).
39. Id. at 372-73 (Points of Counsel).
40. Id. at 376-78, 372 N.E.2d at 547-49, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759-61.
41. See pt. III infra.
42. The right to a public trial developed from an early Anglo-Saxon tradition proclaiming
a duty in all freemen to participate and attend in the proceeding. F. POLLOCK, THE EXPANSION
OF THE COMMON LAW 139, 142 (1904). In his Second Institutes, Lord Coke commented on the
importance of a public trial in English law. " 'These words are of great importance, for all
causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined before the judges of the king's court openly
in the king's court whither all persons may resort.'" United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308
N.Y. 71, 89, 123 N.E.2d 777, 786 (1954) (Froessel, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 COKE'S SECOND
INSTITUTES 103 (1797) (emphasis added by Judge Froessel)). Sir William Blackstone also
outlined the importance of the presence of spectators at trial:
[AIIl this evidence is to be given in open court, in the presence of the parties, their
attorneys, and all bystanders, and before the judge and jury: each party having liberty
to accept to its competency, which exceptions are publicly stated, and by the judge
are openly and publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country; which must
curve any secret bias or partiality, that might arise in his own breast.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *372.
In 1823 Jeremy Bentham stated one of the most frequently given reasons for the creation
of this right. "The advantages of publicity are neither inconsiderable or unobvious ... [tihe
publicity of the examination or deposition operates as a check upon mendacity and incorrect-
ness." I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE FOR JUDICIAL EVIDENCE bk. 2, ch. 10, at 522 (1827).
43. Documentation granting a public trial right first existed in this country in the
CHARTER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF NEW JERSEY in 1676. Chapter XXI provided:
[T]hat in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal any person
or persons, inhabitants of the said Province may freely come into, and attend the said
courts, and hear and be present, at all or any such tryals as shall be there had or
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sixth amendment to the Constitution embodies this right by provid-
ing that "in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury. . ....
Many state constitutions also grant this right in similar terms."5
Although the New York State Constitution does not specifically
grant the right to a public trial, statutory provisions insure it to both
the accused and all members of the public. A New York statute
grants this guarantee directly to the accused. The New York Civil
Rights Law provides:"
In all criminal prosecutions the accused has a right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury, and is entitled to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; and
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
However, the right to a public trial does not rest solely with the
individual on trial. An open court also serves to instill a sense of
trust in the judicial process.47 The New York Judiciary Law states
that, except in trials or proceedings concerning certain sex offenses,
every court may be freely attended by every citizen." Every member
passed, that justice may not be done in a corner nor in a covert manner, being intended
and resolved, by the help of the Lord ....
5 THORPE, AMERICAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAW, 1492-1908, at 2551 (1909).
Soon thereafter, William Penn signed into law the FRAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
PENNSYLVANIA which provided in part "[that all courts shall be open, and justice shall
neither be sold, denied nor delayed." 5 THORPE, supra at 3060. And, at the first congressional
meeting which laid the foundation for the Bill of Rights, James Madison also requested this
safeguard. F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 30 (1951).
The right to a public trial is today specifically provided for in the sixth amendment to the
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Supreme Court has since held that the guaranty of a public trial is a due process right
which is applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. See Argersinger v. Ham-
lin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
272 (1948).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. Most state constitutions contain language which grants the right to a public trial in
terms which are similar to the sixth amendment. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI with,
e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6. However, three states, Maryland, New Hampshire and
Wyoming have no statutory backing for this right, but do acknowledge a' common law heritage
for an open trial. See State v. Holm, 67 Wyo. 360, 384, 224 P.2d 500, 508 (1950); see also
Dutton v. State, 123 Md. 373, 91 A. 417 (1914); State v. Copp, 15 N.H. 212, 215 (1844).
46. N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 12 (McKinney 1976) (emphasis added).
47. People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 73, 286 N.E.2d 265, 266, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885,887 (1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973).
48. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1968).
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of the public 9 as well as the accused, 5 may object whenever a trial
or proceeding is closed to spectators. In the past, the New York
courts have strictly upheld this right. Nevertheless, the statutes do
not place "a rigid inflexible straitjacket"'" on the ability of a trial
judge to close a courtroom whenever extraordinary circumstances
threaten his ability to conduct the proceeding fairly." For example,
courts have excluded the public during a trial when the identity of
the witness had to be concealed,53 when spectators embarrassed 5
49. Usually the members of the audience who will argue a court-imposed restrictive order
are news reporters who are covering the proceeding. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539 (1976); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
50. See, e.g., cases cited in note 55 infra.
51. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 63, 123 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954); see also People v.
Nicholas, 35 A.D.2d 18, 312 N.Y.S.2d 645 (3d Dep't 1970).
52. E.g., In re O'Connell's Estate, 90 Misc. 2d 555, 394 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sur. Ct. 1977)
(fact that decedent was eminent public figure was not appropriate unusual circumstance en-
abling surrogate court to close estate proceeding to public); State v. Genese, 102 N.J.L. 134,
142, 130 A. 642, 646 (1925) (trial judge in murder prosecution may exclude part of audience
from trial when defendant's right to speedy and fair trial is not thereby infringed and such
exclusion is necessary to secure administration of justice and facilitate orderly and proper
conduct of trial).
53. United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 520 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
937 (1975) (interest of state in preserving confidentiality of undercover agents in narcotics
cases, preserving their future usefulness, and safeguarding their lives, provided adequate
justification for excluding public from trial for limited period while agents were testifying);
People v. Eason, 40 N.Y.2d 297, 353 N.E.2d 587, 386 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1976) (exclusion of public
while undercover officers were testifying was not erroneous as a matter of law or in violation
of Constitution); People v. Medina, 56 A.D.2d 582, 391 N.Y.S.2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (motion
to set aside trial because identity of undercover agent was not revealed at trial denied);
People v. Garcia, 51 A.D.2d 329, 381 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1976), aff'd, 41 N.Y.2d 861,
356 N.E.2d 480, 387 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (1977) (exclusion of public during testimony of under-
cover agent in trial of defendant. for sale of dangerous drug was proper since officer was en-
gaged in undercover narcotics investigations in which disclosure would have impaired his
usefulness and might have jeopardized his life). Contra, People v. Richards, 48 A.2d 792,
369 N.Y.S.2d 162 (1st Dep't 1975) (ability of judge to close trial should be sparingly exercised
and is not proper on the mere showing that identity of undercover officer should be protected
because officer is still engaged in similar activities in same general area).
54. Reagan v. United States, 202 F. 488 (9th Cir. 1913) (defendant in prosecution for rape
was not deprived of public trial by order clearing courtroom of spectators but permitting all
court officials and persons connected with case in any way to remain); Hogan v. State, 191
Ark. 437, 86 S.W.2d 931 (1935) (trial judge properly closed trial to spectators during testimony
of ten year old rape victim when previous testimony by victim was unsatisfactory because
she was frightened and embarrassed by presence of the crowd); Kirstowsky v. Superior Court
of Sonoma County, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163 (1956) (trial judge in his discretion
may exclude public and press during female defendant's testimony where judge feels that
because of emotional disturbance caused by audience, defendant would not be able to testify
freely and completely); People v. Smallwood, 38 A.D.2d 892 (2d Dep't), aff'd without opinion,
31 N.Y.2d 750, 290 N.E.2d 435, 338 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1972) (public was properly excluded during
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or frightened a witness,5" and when members of the audience re-
peatedly disrupted the trial." However to avoid the traditional
dangers of a secret tribunal, the power of the judge to draw the
curtain over a trial has always been exercised sparingly.57
When a judge excludes spectators from a criminal proceeding,
both the press and the accused may object to the procedure, claim-
ing that specific statutes grant the right to an open courtroom.58
Thus, in most instances, the interests of the press and the accused
coincide. However, the Gannett case presented a somewhat differ-
ent issue. The accused requested the trial judge to close the suppres-
sion hearing, while the press petitioned for an open proceeding."
Therefore the interests of the press and the accused were in opposi-
tion.
In evaluating the propriety of Judge De Pasquale's closure order
with respect to the historically based open trial guarantee, the New
York Court of Appeals considered two issues. Initially, the court
balanced the right of the accused to close the hearing against the
right of the press to keep it open." The court then considered
testimony of sixteen year old pregnant witness because she was afraid of defendant's friends
in courtroom). See also United States ex rel. Smallwood v. La Valle, 377 F. Supp. 1148
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920
(1974).
55. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 957 (1970) (order excluding spectators from courtroom did not deny accused public
trial, where it appeared to trial judge that state's witness was being intimidated by certain
persons in courtroom); United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1965)
(exclusion of public, except for members of press and bar, from trial was not unreasonable
when it was apparent that defendant and his sympathizers were attempting to prevent
orderly presentation of case by harassing and intimidating witnesses); People v. Hagan, 24
N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 (1969) (exclusion
of press and public did not deprive defendant's right to public trial when lawyer for witness
stated that witness feared for his life because threats had been made against him).
56. United States v. Kobli, 172F.2d 919, 922 (3d Cir. 1949) (spectators who are admitted
to trial must observe proper decorum and if their conduct tends in any way to interfere with
administration of justice in courtroom, they may be removed). See also State v. Copp, 15
N.H. 212, 214-15 (1844); Bishop v. State, 19 Ala. App. 326, 97 So. 169 (1923); New York State
Licensed Bail Agent's Ass'n v. Murtagh, 200 Misc. 1095, 107 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1951),
aff'd, 279 A.D. 851, 110 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 279 A.D. 893, 111 N.Y.S.2d
606 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 303 N.Y. 1009, 106 N.E.2d 284 (1952).
57. See, e.g., People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1972);
Gannett Co. v. Mark, 54 A.D.2d 818, 387 N.Y.S.2d 336 (4th Dep't 1976).
58. Compare People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) with United Press Ass'n
v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954). See also note 68 infra.
59. 43 N.Y.2d at 375, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
60. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 378, 379, 372 N.E.2d 544, 548, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 760-61 (1977).
NOTES
whether the unusual circumstances presented in the criminal trial
were adequate grounds to close a pretrial hearing."
The court of appeals adhered to the prior New York view in decid-
ing the first issue.2 While various purposes have been attributed to
the doctrine of the public trial in criminal cases, the primary pur-
pose has traditionally been regarded as a protective device insuring
against prosecution and abuse of judicial authority over the ac-
cused. 4 Therefore, the public trial requirement "is for the benefit
of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt with and
not unjustly condemned." 5 Past decisions in the New York courts
have uniformly followed this rationale. For example, in United Press
Associations v. Valente,6" the New York Court of Appeals held that
newspaper publishers had been properly barred from the proceed-
ing. However, in the companion case of People v. Jelke,17 the ac-
cused was granted a new trial. Contrary to its decision in Valente,
the court held it improper to exclude spectators from the courtroom
because the defendant's right to an.open trial was thereby violated."
The Valente court stated:6"
61. Id. at 380-81, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 762-63 (1977).
62. See notes 70-71 infra and accompanying text.
63. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
64. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 62, 123 N.E.2d 769, 771-72 (1954).
65. 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 647 (8th ed. 1927), quoted in United Press
Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 80, 123 N.E.2d 777, 780 (1954).
66. 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
67. 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954).
68. In People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954), the defendant was charged in
the Court of General Sessions in the County of New York with committing various crimes
including compulsory prostitution. Id. at 60, 123 N.E.2d at 770. The trial judge, Francis L.
Valente, issued an order on his own motion to close the court to the general public on the
grounds that the sordid and obscene details of the opening statements necessitated that the
trial be closed. Id. The court permitted any friends or relatives of the accused to remain. Id.
at 61, -123 N.E.2d at 771.
In the companion case, United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954),
members of the media alleged that the closure order issued in Jelke had denied the press,
acting as a representative of the public, the right toattend all judicial proceedings. Id. at
76-77, 123 N.E.2d at 778.
The New York Court of Appeals decided that the order in question should be affirmed as
it applied to the press, id. at 85, 123 N.E.2d at 784, and the accused, People v. Jelke, 308
N.Y. 56, 68, 123 N.E.2d 769, 775 (1954). Therefore, since the court claimed that the right to
a fair trial lay primarily with the accused, id. at 68, 123 N.E. at 775, it granted a new trial to
the defendant inJelke, id. at 68, 123 N.E.2d at 771, yet the press in Valente was denied relief.
308 N.Y. at 85, 123 N.E.2d at 783.
69. United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81, 123 N.E.2d 777, 781 (1954).
.19781
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
The public's interest is adequately safeguarded as long as the accused himself
is given the opportunity to assert on his own behalf, in an available judicial
forum, his right to a trial that is fair and public. The accused's defense is, in
the very nature of things, more than likely to be adequate. Whatever concern
the public may have for a defendant's right to a fair trial, it can seldom
match that of the person whose life or liberty is at stake. . . . As long as the
defendant is assured the right to invoke the guarantees provided for his
protection, the public interest is safe and secure, and there is neither need
nor reason for outsiders to interject themselves into the conduct of the trial.
The Valente and Jelke decisions illustrate how the courts hold the
rights of the accused more dear than the corresponding rights of the
media with respect to the open trial guarantee.
The Gannett court emphatically reaffirmed this proposition.'"
Since the interests of the public did not coincide with the interests
of the accused, the court followed past precedent and held the ac-
cused's rights more important.7' The court reasoned that while the
press and the public certainly have a legitimate concern insuring an
effective and fair proceeding, it is the defendant, after all, whose
liberty is in jeopardy."2
In so deciding, the court took great liberties in order to dismiss
the public's statutory right to be present at trial. The court made a
distinction between a "mere curiosity" on the part of the public,
and a "legitimate public concern" to insure the defendant received
a fair judicial proceeding. According to the court, if a trial judge
makes a determination that the public is merely "curious" instead
of "legitimately concerned" about a trial, the proceeding may be
closed in order to safeguard the integrity of its process. However,
the court did not explain the manner by which this determination
is to be made.74 It is questionable whether any judge can decide
70. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376-77, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 759.
71. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550-51, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
72. Id. at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
73. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
74. After making the distinction between "curiosity" and "legitimate concern" the court
stated:
To safeguard the integrity of its process, the [trial] court was required at the outset
to distinguish mere curiosity from legitimate public interest.
In so doing, the court should, of course, afford members of the news media an
opportunity to be heard, not in the context of a full evidentiary hearing, but in a
preliminary proceeding adequate to determine the magnitude of any genuine public
interest. This may be found to outweigh the risks of premature disclosures. In trials
involving public officials, for instance, the public may have an overwhelming interest
in keeping all proceedings open.
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when public curiosity is not legitimate. As an event becomes more
spectacular and newsworthy, public curiosity becomes more in-
tense. The Gannett decision, however, allows the public's right to
know to be dismissed in this instance. The court applied this vague
standard to approve the closure order issued by Judge De Pas-
quale:75
That level of legitimate public concern was not reached in this case. Wide-
spread public awareness kindled by media saturation does not legitimize
mere curiosity. Here the public's concern was not focused on prosecutorial
or judicial accountability; irregularities, if any, had occurred out of State.
The interest of the public was chiefly one of active curiosity with respect to
a notorious local happening.
The Gannett court also decided that the unusual circumstances7
of the case necessitated the removal of the hearing from public
scrutiny. Prior to the Gannett decision, the burden to prove a seri-
ous and imminent threat to the integrity of the trial rested with the
party requesting a closed trial." However, Gannett significantly lib-
eralizes the standard to be met by a criminal defendant seeking a
closure order. Rather than follow the prior New York view, the court
relied on the standard proposed by the American Bar Association.
According to the ABA, a closure order should be allowed whenever
"dissemination of the evidence may disclose matters that will be
Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762-63.
75. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
76. The New York courts have allowed a closure order on these grounds in the past. See
People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71, 286 N.E.2d 265, 334 N.Y.S.2d 885, cert. denied, 410 U.S.
911 (1972). Conversely, when a closure order was granted in situations where no unusual
circumstances were demonstrated warranting the exclusion, the closure order has been nulli-
fied as a violation of the defendant's right to a public trial. People v. Tillery, 36 A.D.2d 928,
321 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1st Dep't 1971) (record must show "special circumstances" before public
may be excluded); People v. Outcalt, 32 A.D.2d 971, 303 N.Y.S.2d 213 (2d Dep't 1969)
(exclusion of anyone connected with defendant's case was not reasonable basis for closure
order). See also Hearst Corp. v. Cholakis, 54 A.D.2d 592, 386 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep't 1976)
(dealing with pretrial suppression hearing in same manner as trial). For an explanation of
"unusual circumstances" and the manner in which they arise, see notes 52-56 supra and
accompanying text.
77. In Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282 N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972), the court
found that an order banning the press as well as the public from the court was improper.
"[Elven if we were to assume that such an order could ever be justified, . . . it could stand
only upon a clear showing-similar to that required to sustain a contempt order-that it was
necessary to meet 'a serious and imminent threat' to 'the integrity of the trial.' "Id. at 180-
81, 282 N.E.2d at 310, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 413 (1972) (citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373,
377 (1947)).
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inadmissable at trial and is therefore likely to interfere with his
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury."' 8 The new standard pro-
claimed by the Gannett court provides:79
At the point where press commentary on those hearings would threaten the
impaneling of a constitutionally impartial jury in the county of venue,
pretrial evidentiary hearings in this State are presumptively to be closed to
the public.
As the locus of public interest, this determination is to rest with the hear-
ing judge. Of primary consideration is the public's interest in avoiding any
developments that would threaten to truncate a defendant's right to a fair
trial.
The Gannett dissent criticizes the majority's view that an order to
close a courtroom is now valid as long as a defendant can show a
possible threat to an impartial jury.1 Therefore, as long as some risk
of prejudice from media coverage is present, the burden of proof for
obtaining a restrictive order no longer rests with the defendant.
Rather, according to the Gannett holding, this burden switches to
those who have been denied access to the proceeding. This ruling is
far afield of prior statutory and case law in New York State. Now a
closure order will only be denied to a criminal defendant when the
press is able to establish that the "magnitude of any genuine public
78. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS § 3.1
(1968). The complete recommendation specifically concerning pretrial hearing states:
It is recommended that the following rule be adopted in each jurisdiction by the
appropriate court:
Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretrial hearing.
In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case,
including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant may move that all or part of
the hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed on the ground that dissemination
of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters that will be
inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is therefore likely to interfere with his right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless the presiding
officer determines that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With the
consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may take such action on his own motion
or at the suggestion of the prosecution.
Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial hearing is held in chambers or
otherwise closed to the public, a complete record of the proceedings shall be kept and
shall be made available to the public following the completion of trial or disposition
of the case without trial. Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the power
of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution those present that dissemina-
tion of certain information by any means of public communication may jeopardize the
right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Id. (emphasis added).
79. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 762 (emphasis added).
80. Id. at 386-87, 372 N.E.2d at 553, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 766 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
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interest" requires the courtroom to remain open.8
The Gannett situation is distinguishable from past New York
cases because it concerns the closing of a pretrial hearing rather
than a trial.82 The strict New York standard has traditionally re-
quired the defendant to establish a threat to the integrity of a trial
before a closure order could issue. 3 However, in the criminal prose-
cution, Judge De Pasquale allowed the closure order without de-
manding proof of its necessity by the defendant.8 Thus, the pre-
vious standard was not met. Apparently the court of appeals
changed the standard in Gannett. The court believed the crucial
factor to be the pretrial proceeding.
The closure order is necessary to insure that a trial judge can
impanel an impartial jury.85 This is a guarantee specifically pro-
vided in the sixth amendment to the Constitution.86 While prejudi-
cial publicity can be kept from a jury during a trial by a sequestra-
tion order, there is no analogous way to protect prospective jurors
at apretrial hearing. Prior to Gannett, only one New York case had
questioned the closure of a pretrial hearing upon defendant's mo-
tion. In Hearst Corporation v. Cholakis,87 the accused requested a
suppression hearing to be closed to the media on the grounds that
adverse publicity could endanger the fairness of the trial. The appel-
late division ruled the order improper and reversed the trial court.88
The decision rested on the inability of the defendant to substantiate
his claim at the trial level. 8 Thus, prior to the Gannett decision, the
standard to close either a trial or a pretrial hearing was identical.
Closing the pretrial hearing may be the most equitable result,
given the circumstances in Gannett." However, in the past, courts
81. Id. at 381, 372 N.E.2d at 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d 762-63.
82. Id. at 378, 372 N.E.2d at 548-49, 401 N.Y.S.2d 761.
83. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
84. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 110, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722.
85. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 762 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
86. The sixth amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(emphasis added).
87. Hearst Corp. v. Cholakis, 54 A.D.2d 592, 386 N.Y.S.2d 892 (3d Dep't 1976).
88. Id. at 593, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
89. Id,
90. The appellate division did not hold that Judge De Pasquale's order was entirely
without merit. Rather, the court disallowed it due to the lack of factual basis within the record
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have often overturned similar orders." This was not because the
accused lacked the ability to request a closure order. Rather, it is
because he failed to establish circumstances proving the necessity
for this remedy. Therefore, an important ramification of the
Gannett holding is the relative ease by which a New York trial judge
may now properly close a pretrial hearing." In fact, under the terms
proposed in Gannett nearly every pretrial hearing in New York
State could be closed with little effort. 3 This result would greatly
diminish the press's ability to report facts to the public, and, in
addition, would go beyond the intent of the Gannett decision.
Gannett has been sharply criticized in at least one circuit court.
In United States v. Cianfrani, the Third Circuit invalidated an
order which excluded members of the press from a pretrial hearing."
The defendant asserted that he had a sixth amendment right to
close the hearing at his request. At oral argument the Gannett deci-
sion was cited to buttress this claim." Chief Judge Seitz disagreed
with the defendant's argument and rejected the reasoning in
Gannett. The court stated, "[w]e have studied the opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals in Gannett Co., and we find its analysis
of the sixth amendment unacceptable.""
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to re-
view the Gannett case." Apparently the Court recognized the
need to establish a uniform balance between restrictive orders
imposed on the press, and a defendant's sixth amendment right
to a fair trial.
to merit such an extraordinary remedy. See Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 55 A.D.2d 107, 389
N.Y.S.2d 719 (4th Dep't 1976).
91. See, e.g., Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 282
N.E.2d 306, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1972); Hearst Corp. v. Cholakis, 54 A.D.2d 592, 386 N.Y.S.2d
892 (3d Dep't 1976).
92. The pre-Gannett standard called for a showing of "unusual circumstances" or "a
serious or imminent threat to the integrity of the trial" in order to close a pretrial hearing.
See notes 52-56 supra and accompanying text. However, the Gannett court allowed an exclu-
sionary order to stand whenever adverse commentary would threaten the impaneling of an
impartial jury in the county of venue. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
93. Goodale, News Media and the Law: Fair Trial-Free Press-N ew Deluge of Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 26, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978).
96. Id. at 851.
97. Id. at 851 n.4.
98. Id.
99. 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
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IV. The Freedom of the Press Guarantee
A second, and perhaps more controversial problem was presented
in Gannett. When the New York Court of Appeals restricted the
media from freely reporting information to the public, the first
amendment freedom of the press guarantee was seriously cur-
tailed.1'®
The first amendment to the Constitution provides: "Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or the
press. . ... 0, This protection applies to the states under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 02
The trial court in Gannett had granted the closure order specifi-
cally to curtail further press coverage.0 3 Nevertheless, a weakness
of the New York Court of Appeals decision in Gannett is the insuffi-
cient attention given in the opinion to the first amendment argu-
ment.' 0 This is especially true after an examination of the surround-
ing circumstances in the case.' ®
The petitioner was a respected member of the press reporting the
even s of the criminal prosecution from the date of its inception.1 6
In addition, the appellate division, 0 7 as well as Judge Cooke's dis-
100. The "Fair Trial/Free Press" issue has become one of the most controversial topics in
the wake of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See note 5 supra. The Supreme Court
in Sheppard departed from the "traditional view that the discretion of the trial judge. . . is
extremely broad and that actual prejudice . . . must be shown in order to obtain release in
cases which question the ability of the courts to inhibit press coverage on grounds that it
infringes on a defendant's sixth amendment fair trial right." ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTIcE: FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 112 (1968). Many commentators have writ-
ten on this subject. See, e.g., Landau, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due Process Proposal, 62
A.B.A.J. 55 (1976); Warren & Abell, Free Press-Fair Trial: The "Gag Order, "A California
Abberration, 45 S. CAL. L. RFv. 51 (1972); Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defen-
dant Against Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1971); SPECIAL COMM. ON
RADIO, TELEvISION, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CrrY OF NEW YORK-FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1967); Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior
Restraints, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977); Goodale, The Press Ungagged: The Practical Effect
on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L. REv. 497 (1977).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
102. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
103. 43 N.Y.2d 370, 375, 372 N.E.2d 544, 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758.
104. See Rothblatt, Fair Trial-Free Press: The Recurring Theme, N.Y.L.J., January 27,
1978, at 26, col. 2.
105. For a review of the facts presented before the New York Court of Appeals in the
Gannett case, see the text accompanying notes 25-41 supra.
106. See 43 N.Y.2d at 374-75, 372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758-59.
107. The appellate division decision stated that "[tihe exclusionary order entered here
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sent in the court of appeals,s' relied heavily on first amendment
reasoning to disallow Judge De Pasquale's order. Nevertheless, after
recognizing the invalidation of "gag" orders by the Supreme Court
in Nebraska Press,'"I the court of appeals side-stepped the first
amendment problem with this statement: "This, of course, does not
mean that trial courts are left powerless to stem improper revelation
of facts that would present an imminent threat to the impaneling
of a constitutionally impartial jury.""' 0 The New York Court of Ap-
peals virtually ignored the media's strongest argument against re-
strictive orders. Since these orders indirectly restrict the press' abil-
ity to publish freely, they have the same effect, and should be
treated in the same manner as "prior restraints" on the press.
A. The Prior Restraint Doctrine
An integral aspect of the first amendment freedom of the press
guarantee is that all orders imposing prior restraints on the publica-
tion or broadcast of information carry a heavy presumption against
their constitutional validity."' In fact, the Supreme Court has de-
clared that "the main purpose of the First Amendment is to prevent
all such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced
by other governments.""' Although prior restraints have never been
held to be unconstitutional per se, "1 the Supreme Court typically
prohibits their use."' In order to justify the issuance of an order
which has the effect of a prior restraint, the Court has always re-
infringed petitioners First Amendment rights in that it constituted a violation of the rights
of the press to publish free from unlawful governmental interference." 55 A.D.2d 107, 110,
389 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (4th Dep't 1976).
108. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 382, 372 N.E.2d 544, 551, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 763 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting). Judge Cooke stated: "A closed proceeding should be
recognized for what it is-a 'serious backdoor threat to First Amendment interests.'" Id. at
384, 372 N.E.2d at 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 765 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
109. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558 (1976) (citing Carroll v. Princess
Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968)). See also Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
110. 43 N.Y.2d at 379-80, 372 N.E.2d at 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
111. Id. at 380, 372 N.E.2d at 549-50, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 762. See also note 36 supra.
112. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907), quoted in Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 557 (1976). Similar statements have frequently been voiced by the
Court. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297
U.S. 233, 243 (1936).
113. The Supreme Court has often qualified the prior restraint doctrine in this manner.
See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963); Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 249 (1936).
114. See notes 119 infra and accompanying text.
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quired the strictest burden of proof."5
The Court has never delineated the precise parameters of a prior
restraint;"' yet, the concept has expanded continuously with the
passage of time."' Originally, a prior restraint was defined by the
English as prohibiting publication without advance approval of the
government."8 In this country, the doctrine has taken on the highest
constitutional importance."' Any "trivial distinctions between
types of government intrusion will not be relied upon when the
effects impinge the Free Press guarantee."'' 0 Thus, the Supreme
Court has held invalid a Minnesota statute which deemed any mali-
cious, scandalous and defamatory publication a public nuisance,''
and has struck down an injunction that prohibited demonstrators
from picketing and distributing leaflets.' In addition, the Court did
not permit the Government to enjoin the publication of excerpts
from a top secret study of the Vietnam conflict,'23 nor allow a "gag"
order to be placed on members of the press.'2
The Court has not limited the prior restraint doctrine to direct
infringements on the right to publish. In Grosjean v. American Press
Co., '2 a tax imposed on newspapers according to the number of
copies in circulation was invalidated as a prior restraint. The tax
115. The Court so stated in Nebraska Press. "[I]t is nonetheless clear that the barriers
to prior restraint remain high unless we are to abandon what the Court has said for nearly a
quarter of our national existence and implied throughout all of it." 427 U.S. at 561.
116. The Second Circuit recently explored the origins of the prior restraint doctrine in the
Supreme Court. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974,-989 n.18 (2d Cir. 1977).
117. See text accompanying notes 112-23 infra.
118. 568 F.2d at 989 n.18 (2d Cir. 1977).
119. Id. at 989. The Supreme Court has held that "[any prior restraint on expression
comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its constitutional validity." Organiza-
tion for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1911).
120. 568 F.2d at 990 n.22. The Supreme Court has often acknowledged this view. In Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court held "[g]overnmental
restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to
constitutional limitations on governmental powers." Id. at 256.
121. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
122. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). The Court also held
an ordinance prohibiting the distribution of "circulars, handbills, advertising, or literature
of any kind" invalid on its face as a prior restraint in Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450-51
(1938), and struck down an order prohibiting door-to-door canvassing of religious literature
as a prior restraint in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
123. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
124. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976). For a detailed discussion of this
decision, see notes 130-39 infra and accompanying text.
125. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
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had the indirect effect of restricting circulation and lowering adver-
tising revenues. "' Recently, courts have explored the possibility
that a newsgathering privilege,'1 and even an editorial process' 2'
may be considered a prior restraint on publication. Thus, the judici-
ary has increasingly expanded the meaning of "prior restraint",
narrowly restricting if not forbidding any governmental restraints
on publication. 2'
A major issue squarely presented by the Gannett holding is the
effect on the freedom of the press guarantee of closing a pretrial
hearing to the public; whether a denial to it of immediate access to
the record can be considered a prior restraint on publication. The
Court examined the constitutionality of a pretrial restrictive order
in only one case, Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart.'30 In
Nebraska Press, the Court was concerned with a restrictive order
which enjoined the press from reporting the facts of a pretrial sup-
pression hearing. The facts of the case are similar to those in
Gannett.'3 In the state case underlying Nebraska Press, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held constitutional a modified version of a
trial court's "gag order," which restrained the members of the press
from reporting events that had taken place at the hearing.'3 2 The
trial judge granted the order at the request of the defendant's attor-
ney. The court found a "reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news
which would make difficult, if not impossible, the impaneling of an
126. Id. at 244-45.
127. See Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977) where the court reversed an order
to compel discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The order sought to allow a public figure
who was bringing a libel action to inquire into a journalist's thoughts, opinions and conclu-
sions. Chief Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority stated:
Invoking the broad words of the First Amendment, the Supreme Court has never
hesitated to forge specific safeguards to insure the continued vitality of the press. It
has repeatedly recognized the essentially tripartite aspect of the press' work and func-
tion in: (1) acquiring information, (2) 'processing' that information and (3) disseminat-
ing the information. The Supreme Court was aware that if any link in that chain were
broken, the free flow of information inevitably ceases.
568 F.2d at 976.
128. Id. at 979.
129. For an historical analysis of the prior restraint doctrine see Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
130. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
131. Compare 427 U.S. at 542-45 with Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d at 374-75,
372 N.E.2d at 546, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 758.
132. See State v. Simanta, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975).
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impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair trial."'33 The United States
Supreme Court reversed in Nebraska Press. ,34
The Court held that the trial court had not established that the
"gravity of the evil" of prejudicial news, "discounted by its improb-
ability" of harming the defendant at trial, justified such invasions
of free speech as were necessary to avoid the danger of promoting
an unfair trial.' 35 The Court examined the record to determine the
nature and extent of the prejudicial news coverage,'36 the possibility
of mitigating the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity in some
other manner than a restrictive order,' 3 and the effectiveness of the
restraining order in preventing the threatened danger to the pro-
ceeding. 38 Since the record did not overcome the barriers estab-
lished for justifying a restrictive order against the media, the Court
held that the "gag" order was "clearly invalid." '
In Nebraska Press, the Court emphatically reaffirmed the strict
standard demanded for the justification of prior restraints, even in
face of a sixth amendment challenge.'"° However, the Court did not
declare that the sixth amendment right of the accused to a fair trial
is subordinate to the right of the press to publish.'' Rather, the
Court noted that there may be certain circumstances that would
demand the use of a prior restraint;'42 although the decision did not
specify what these circumstances would entail. Five Justices would
133. See 427 U.S. at 542.
134. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
135. Id. at 562, citing United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd,
341 U.S. 494 (1951). Although courts have generally used the Holmes-Brandeis "clear and
present danger" standard when judicial restraints upon the press are at issue, the test
applied in the Nebraska Press decision, first proposed by Learned Hand in United States v.
Dennis, is slightly less demanding. See Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 539, 541 (1977).
136. 427 U.S. at 562-63.
137. Id. at 563-65. For a list of the ways a court may mitigate the effects of prejudicial
publicity see note 8 supra.
138. Id. at 565-67. It is questionable as to whether a restrictive order which "gags" or
excludes members of the media is an effective means to protect the defendant. See Simon,
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the
Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515 (1977).
139. 427 U.S. at 570.
140. Id. at 561. For the Court's language concerning the standard required for a prior
restraint, see note 115 supra,
141. 427 U.S. at 561.
142. Id. at 570.
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have maintained even a stricter standard, and expressed doubt as
to the propriety of prior restraints under any circumstances.'
B. The Gannett Closure Order as a Prior Restraint
The Gannett ruling leaves the Supreme Court with a bifurcated
issue: whether the restrictive order should be defined as a prior
restraint in the wake of the Nebraska Press decision; and, if this
restrictive order is held not to be a prior restraint on publication,
whether the Court would consider the closure order a proper rem-
edy.
When a court issues an order to prevent the press from publishing
information in its possession, the order is usually considered a prior
restraint on publication. 4' For example, in the Nebraska Press
"gag" order case,"5 the media obtained the information at a pretrial
hearing and a subsequent court order attempted to enjoin the press
from publishing it.' The press was thereby "gagged" because it
could not freely report facts in its possession. The Supreme Court
struck down this order as -an improper restraint on publication.'47
However, in Gannett, the New York Court of Appeals recognized
that any information in the possession of the media can be freely
reported,"' but distingushed Gannett from Nebraska Press. The
media in the Gannett case had never been in possession of the
restricted information, since the trial court closed the hearing to all
spectators. Therefore, the Gannett court was not technically re-
straining publication; it was merely preventing the access of the
143. Justice White stated that "there is grave doubt in my mind whether orders with
respect to the press such as were entered in this case would ever be justifiable." Id. at 570
(White, J., concurring). Justice Powell would have allowed a prior restraint only when
prejudicial publicity "poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly and irreparably, the
impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment requirement of impartiality." Id. at 571
(Powell, J., concurring). And two Justices joined with Justice Brennen's view that "resort
to prior restraints on the freedom of the press is a constitutionally impermissable method for
enforcing that right." Id. at 572 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment, in which Stewart
and Marshall, J.J., joined).
144. In Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1977), Chief Judge Kaufman considered
a prior restraint as simply "prohibiting government from censoring publications in advance."
Id. at 989.
145. Nebraska Press Ass'n Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
146. Id. at 541.
147. See notes 136-39 supra and accompanying text.
148. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 379, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 761-62 (1977).
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media to this information.'" According to this interpretation, the
Gannett closure order was not a prior restraint on publication.'50 In
the Gannett dissent, Judge Cooke disagreed with this logic in that
no fundumental difference in effect exists between a "gag" and
closure order.'5 ' "[T]he right of free expression must encompass
both the freedom to convey information about a public matter and
the liberty to gain access to proceedings involving the same."' 5
If it is assumed the Gannett majority erred in distingushing a
"gag"order from a closure order, the Supreme Court will not affirm
149. The court made this distinction: "Defendants Greathouse and Jones sought to invoke
these constitutional norms, not by excluding the public or the press from a highly sensational-
ized murder trial, but rather by excluding allegedly tainted evidence of guilt." Gannett Co.
v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 379, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 761 (1977). This
is similar to the view taken in United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, where the New York Court of
Appeals emphasized that
this is not a case of free speech or freedom of the press and that the right asserted by
petitioner is not embraced within the constitutional provision guaranteeing those free-
doms. . . .[F]reedom of the press is in no way abridged by an exclusionary ruling
which denies to the public generally, including newspapermen, the opportunity to "see
and hear what transpired.
308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954). Nevertheless other courts have disagreed with
the view that the first and sixth'amendment rights exist as separate, distinct guarantees. See
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976). In Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974
(2d Cir. 1977), the court stated that an indirect restraint, as well as a direct one, acts to
subvert publication and should be examined carefully. Id. at at 976-77. Finally, the dissenting
opinion in Gannett specifically disagreed with the majority on this point.
This court's recognition of an exclusion order as a general prophylactic against the
influence of unknown and undocumented prejudices upon the tribunal's deliberative
function suggests an almost casual acceptance of a prior burden on the freedom of the
press, a burden presumptively repugnant to the ends of the First Amendment ...
[Tihe right to report the news is too vital to the nature of a free state to allow the
press to be stifled under the pressure of direct "gag" orders, or even more subtle means
of accomplishing the same illicit end.
Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 384, 372 N.E.2d 544, 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 756
(1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting).
See also the discussion of United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3rd Cir. 1978), at note
157 infra.
150. For a critical discussion of this view, see Goodale, News Media and the Law: Fair
Trial-Free Press-New Deluge of Cases, January 26, 1978, N.Y.L.J., at 1, col. 1.
151. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 384, 372 N.E.2d 544, 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 764-65 (1977) (Cooke, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
the premise that there is any significant difference in denying access to information
about a matter of public interest-upon undocumented, unproven and conclusory
allegations of possible prejudice-assumes that the right to observe an otherwise public
proceeding is severable from and of less value than the right to convey information
about it. Any such distinction is without substance.
Id. (Cooke, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 384, 372 N.E.2d at 552, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 765. (Cooke, J., dissenting).
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the Gannett decision. '53 However the Court has not yet decided
whether a closure order demands the same heightened scrutiny as
"gag" orders and other prior restraints.
In Nebraska Press, the Supreme Court did make reference to the
closing of a pretrial hearing on the motion of the defendant as a
possible alternative to a "gag" order."' However, the Court did not
specifically approve this procedure. Rather, the Court merely re-
ferred to closure orders "recommended in guidelines that have
emerged from various studies."'55 Since the Supreme Court did not
forbid the use of closure orders, the Gannett majority assumed the
Court would permit such orders in the future."'S
If a closure order is not considered a prior restraint per se,57 the
Court should still decide if the circumstances presented in Gannett
should permit the exclusion of the press and the public. The Court
has always demanded any final order restraining a first amendment
right to be narrowly construed;' 8 however, the rule established by
153. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (gag orders held "clearly
invalid"). See also N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 715 (1971). If the Court
decides that the Gannett closure order should be treated as a prior restraint, it is unlikely
that the Court will affirm its validity. See note 143 supra and accompanying text.
154. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 n.8 (1976).
155. Id.
156. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549-50, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 762.
157. In United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978), Chief Judge Seitz invalida-
ted a pretrial restrictive order on sixth amendment grounds. See text accompanying notes
95-98 supra. In addition, the court rejected the theory that the closure order could be viewed
as a prior restraint on the press.
No prior restraint is involved. The press remains free to publish whatever it learns in
open court or elsewhere. We therefore hold that the confined, in many instances tempo-
rary, and strictly regulated limits on access outlined above do not violate the first
amendment rights of the press or of the public in general.
573 F.2d at 861.
However, Judge Gibbons disagreed with Judge Seitz's analysis of the first amendment. In
the concurring opinion Judge Gibbons stated:
Protection of that right of access, to the extent recognized in Chief Judge Seitz's
opinion, should rest upon a broader constitutional foundation than is afforded by the
sixth amendment. That foundation, I suggest, is the federal common law implied from
the first amendment. Moreover, the public access right has a constitutionally pro-
tected minimum contact.
Id. at 862 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court has also considered the right to gather information, and has held
that this freedom is of critical importance. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 495 (1975).
158. See note 115 supra and accompanying text.
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Gannett relaxes the prior standard-possibly to an unconstitutional
level. 56
V. The Argument Against Mootness
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III, section
two of the Constitution extends only to actual cases and controver-
sies.' 0 If the effect of a decision at trial is short-lived, the Court may
subsequently dismiss the appeal as moot when only an abstract
question remains at the time of review.'"' Exceptions to the moot-
ness doctrine do however exist.'62 This section briefly examines the
Gannett holding in light of the mootness issue, and suggests that the
Supreme Court will not dismiss the Gannett case on mootness
grounds. '
Before the New York Court of Appeals decided the Gannett case,
both defendants in the connected criminal prosecution had received
reduced sentences after plea bargaining.'63 The closure order remedy
was no longer relevant with respect to that particular prosecution,
and the court could have considered the ancillary issue moot.' 4
However, the New York court decided to hear the case because the
issue was of the nature that typically evades review.' 5 At stake was
159. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
160. Indianapolis School Comm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 397-403 (1975).
161. In Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895), the Court stated: "The duty of this Court,
as of every other judicial tribunal is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which can
be carried into effect, and not to give opinions on moot questions .. " Id. at 653. For a de-
tailed discussion on the ability of the Court to decide borderline cases see Note, The Moot-
ness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARv. L. REv. 373 (1974); Comment, Disposition of
Moot Cases by the United States Supreme Court, 23 U. CHI. L. REv. 77, 78-79 (1955).
162. For example, when the litigation at bar is capable of repetition, the Supreme Court
has often gone to the merits. See Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498, 514-15
(1910) (I.C.C. orders); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124-125 (1973) (pregnancy litigation). See
also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 178-
79 (1968); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953). But cf. DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (issue concerning discriminatory law school admissions policy
held moot because action was brought by individual and not class and thus not capable of
repetition).
163. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376 n.1, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547 n.1, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 759 n.1 (1977).
164. 43 N.Y.2d at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
165. Id. There have been numerous cases dealing with the rights of the public and press
to an open trial where the New York courts have retained jurisdiction even though the relief
sought was no longer appropriate. See Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171, 177, 282 N.E.2d 306,
308, 331 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (1972); United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 76, 123 N.E.2d
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a court's inherent ability to control its judicial proceeding.6 This
reasoning is in accord with other recent Supreme Court decisions. 7
Nevertheless, since the Court has granted certiorari to the Gannett
case,6 8 the issue of mootness is once again resurrected.
It would be inappropriate for the Supreme Court to dismiss the
Gannett case on mootness grounds, especially in the wake of the
Court's decision in Nebraska Press."'I The Court entertained
Nebraska Press although the "gag" order was no longer in force.',"
The mootness argument was dismissed on two grounds.' First, the
Court reasoned that if the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's conviction, and ordered a new trial, the judge could
again impose a "gag". order to restrict prejudicial publicity.7 2 The
action was therefore capable of repetition. In addition, the lower
decision authorized state prosecutors to seek restrictive orders in
certain circumstances, therefore the same type of dispute could
recur between the courts and the press at a later date.' The Su-
preme Court decided that this issue was capable of repetition, yet
evading review' since the "gag" order was, by its nature, short-
lived.'
The Gannett controversy poses a similar situation to the Supreme
Court. As in Nebraska Press, Gannett liberalizes the ability of coun-
777, 777 (1954). For a general discussion concerning the power of the New York courts to hear
such cases, see H. COHEN & A. KARGER, PowERs op THE NEw YORK COURT Op APPFALS 420-21
(1952).
166. Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 376, 372 N.E.2d 544, 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d
756, 759 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978). The court stated:
[T]his is far from an ordinary appeal. It crystallizes a recurring and delicate issue of
concrete significance both to the courts and the news media. And in its broadest
implications, it presents a challenge to a fundamental precept of judicial administra-
tion-the courts' inherent power to control their own process.
43 N.Y.2d at 376, 372 N.E.2d at 547, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
For a recent discussion of the courts' inherent power to close a judicial proceeding to the
press see Note, Protective Orders Against the Press and the Inherent Powers of the Court, 87
N.Y.U. L. REv. 342 (1977).
167. See, e.g., Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976).
168. 98 S. Ct. 1875 (1978) (No. 77-1301).
169. See notes 130-39 supra and accompanying text.
170. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 546-47.
174. Id. at 547.
175. Id.
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sel to seek closure orders against the press."' If an argument is made
to dismiss the decision on mootness grounds the ability of this issue
to be repeated at a later date is nearly identical to the situation
presented to the Court in Nebraska Press. Although numerous in-
consistencies plague the mootness doctrine,'77 precedent to hear a
Gannett-like controversy has been established and should not be
altered.
VI. Conclusion
If the Gannett decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court, the
danger exists that New York courts will liberally construe it, greatly
inhibiting future press coverage of pretrial suppression hearings.
The press might then be dissuaded from attempting to report the
facts of future suppression hearings. The media has always been
"regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field.""'7 A multiplicity of indiscriminate
closure orders would portend disaster to press coverage of criminal
judicial procedure.
Through the Gannett case the New York Court of Appeals liberal-
ized the ability to issue closure orders. The decision has since been
invoked to validate restrictive orders in the lower New York
courts.' The most famous instance was at the competency hearing
of David Berkowitz in the "Son of Sam" murder prosecution.'80
Given the existing notoriety of the Berkowitz case, a pretrial closure
order may be the only effective method to protect the defendant's
sixth amendment rights. However, the remaining examples of the
Gannett-based restrictive orders rest on, at best, tenuous grounds.'
176. See notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text supra.
177. See Note, Mootness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 88 HARV. L. REv. 373 (1974);
Comment, Disposition of Moot Cases by the United States Supreme Court, 23 U. Cm. L. REv.
77, 78-79 (1955). Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) with Defunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974).
178. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966), quoted in Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1976).
179. See [19781 3 MEDIA L. REP. 1560 (BNA); 46 U.S.L.W. 2381 (January 24, 1978); N.Y.
Times, March 28, 1978, at 38, col. 1.
180. N.Y. Times, April 13, 1978, at B10, col. 3.
181. After Gannett was decided in the New York Court of Appeals, two trial courts
invoked Gannett to limit the ability of the press to cover pretrial hearings. However, one trial
judge subsequently lifted the closure order when he decided that the facts before him were
not analogous to Gannett. See [1978] 3 MEDIA L. REP. 1560 (BNA).
The second situation involved a New York Supreme Court justice of Westchester County
1978]
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In order to safeguard both the defendant's and reporters' rights,
the Supreme Court may deem it proper to limit the scope of the
Gannett decision. Clearly, restrictive orders must be allowed in
cases where closure will enable a court to perform efficiently and
fairly. Nevertheless, it should be essential for a defense attorney to
support a closure motion with evidence proving the absolute need
for this extraordinary remedy. The burden of proof should not be
transferred to the press, as in the Gannett decision.'
John G. Luboja
who barred journalists from reporting the facts of a pretrial suppression hearing during the
murder prosecution of two Lewisboro women. Id. The reporters were not excluded from the
hearing, but were enjoined from reporting on the substance of the testimony obtained therein.
This restrictive order is technically a "gag" rather than a "closure" and is invalid under the
United States Supreme Court ruling in Nebraska Press. This type of misapplication is an
inherent danger of the Gannett rule. See id.
182. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
